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Sale of a property gifted under a will by an attorney acting under an enduring power of 
attorney: Does the gift adeem and what is the attorney’s duty? 
 
By Barbara Hamilton and Tina Cockburn1 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court of Queensland has recently considered the consequences of a sale of 
property gifted under a will by an attorney acting under an enduring power of attorney in 
Moylan v Rickard2 (Moylan). The decision makes clear that attorneys acting under enduring 
powers of attorney (EPAs) must exercise their powers for the benefit of the principal (ie their 
duties are fiduciary). Where the powers have not been properly exercised the compensation 
provisions of the Powers of Attorney Act (Qld) 1998 (POAA Qld) can provide effective relief. 
Whether a willed gift adeems depends on a true construction of the gift, but again the POAA 
(Qld) can assist in protecting the proceeds of a property sold under an EPA for the 
beneficiary under the principal’s will. Moylan raises many current issues, but particularly 
illustrates that the POAA (Qld) can provide effective remedies, even when other possible 
avenues of redress (for example by way of family provision application) are unavailable (for 
example because the estate has already been distributed). 
The facts 
Mrs Sybil Moylan (the deceased) and the applicant married in 1979. They lived together in a 
a home at Wilston owned by Mrs Moylan. In 1996 Mrs Moylan made a will and an EPA in 
favour of her two children from her previous marriage. By 2000 Mrs Moylan was suffering 
from the effects of Alzheimer’s disease. She was eventually admitted to an aged care facility 
in 2005. In late 2004 her husband suffered a heart attack and was hospitalised for six months. 
Following his discharge from hospital he went to live with his son Donald.  
In early 2005 the deceased’s children, Robyn Rickard and Christopher Allen (the 
respondents) formed the view that they did not have sufficient funds to maintain the Wilson 
home and pay for their mother’s care. A decision was made to sell the home and it was sold 
for $885,000 in January 2006. It was common ground that the deceased would not have been 
capable of understanding the house was sold at this time. From the proceeds of sale $600,000 
was invested to provide an income for the costs of the deceased’s care and $115,000 was 
given to each of Ms Rickard and Mr Allen by way of gift. 
Mrs Moylan’s 1996 will contained the following material terms relevant to the litigation:3 
“4. I GIVE DEVISE AND BEQUEATH the whole of my estate both real 
and personal of whatsoever kind and nature and wheresoever situate UNTO 
                                                            
1 Faculty of Law, QUT. 
2 [2010] QSC 327. 
3 Moylan at [21]. 
and to the use of my trustees ... TO HOLD the balance then remaining 
(hereinafter called ‘my residuary trust estate’) UPON TRUST as follows:-  
 
... (c) as to the land and improvements constituting my principal place of 
residence at the date of my death (‘house property’) but not including any 
of the contents, to be dealt with as follows:  
(i) my trustees are to obtain a valuation of the market value of the house 
property as soon as practicable after the date of my death;  
(ii) if the house property has neither been sold nor contracted to be sold 
within three (3) months of the date of my death, then my trustees are to pay 
a legacy equal to fifteen (15) per cent of the market value of the house 
property (from which market value, however, is to be deducted sales 
commission at the rate of five per cent on the first EIGHTEEN 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($18,000.00) and two and half per cent on the 
balance, as if the house property had been sold) and to pay such legacy to 
my husband LESLIE PATRICK MOYLAN if he outlives me for thirty (30) 
days;  
(iii) if the house property is sold within such three (3) month period, then 
my trustees are to pay to the said Leslie Patrick Moylan (if he outlives me 
for thirty (30) days) a legacy equal to fifteen (15) per cent of the proceeds 
of sale net of sales commission;  
(iv) once the legacy for the said Leslie Patrick Moylan has been quantified 
pursuant to (ii) or (iii), no later event is to be the basis for any alteration in 
the amount of such legacy;  
(v) the legacy for my said husband, whether it is payable pursuant to (ii) or 
(iii), is not payable to him any earlier than three (3) months from the date 
of my death;  
(vi) as to the house property, or what remains of the proceeds of sale of 
same, to be distributed as part of my net residuary trust estate;  
(d) as to my net residuary trust estate for such of the said Robyn Shirley 
Rickard absolutely and Christopher William Allan absolutely (and in both 
cases, in addition to other benefits derived hereunder) who outlive me and 
if both then equally as tenants in common but subject to what follows... 
 
Mrs Moylan died in April 2008. Probate of the will was granted in October 2008 and 
approximately $250,000 each was distributed to her children by December 2008. In 
August 2009 an enquiry was made to the respondents’ solicitors on behalf of the 
applicant to obtain a copy of the will. The enquirer also asked why the applicant had 
not been contacted about the will. The response given as to why he had not been 
contacted was that as the house had been sold prior to the deceased’s death he was not 
entitled to anything from the estate. 
 
The applicant’s claims 
 
The applicant’s primary claims were: 
a) an order that the gift pursuant to clause 4(c) (of 15% of the value of the 
Wilston home) was not adeemed by the sale of the property;   
b) that the moneys paid the attorneys by way of gift to themselves subsequent to 
the sale of the Wilston house be restored to the estate under s106 and that 
compensation was payable to the applicant under s107 POOA (Qld); 
c) that the respondents pay damages for alleged breach of s33Z Succession Act 
(Qld) (for failing to provide a copy of the deceased’s will to the applicant); 
and 
d) that he should be entitled to further and better provision from the estate under 
s41 Succession Act (Qld) (family provision claim) and that the nine month 
time limitation period should be extended in the circumstances.4 
The court’s decision 
On the first claim as to whether the gift of 15% of the value of the deceased’s home was 
adeemed by the sale prior to death of the home, the court held the doctrine of ademption did 
not apply. The court examined the basic principles of construction of a will and in particular 
the first principle of construction that the court is to give effect to the intention of the testator 
as expressed in the words of the will.5 The court concluded that the gift in clause 4(c) to the 
applicant was not a gift of a specific property, but rather a pecuniary legacy quantified by 
reference to the value of a specific property, the Wilston home which had been sold, but 
which sale did not adeem the general legacy.6 The court drew analogy to Re Viertel7, in 
which case the attorneys under an EPA sold the testator’s house after she had moved into a 
nursing home and lost capacity.8 Her earlier will (the contents of which the attorneys were 
unaware despite making enquiries) had gifted the house property to the attorneys. The court 
held that as the testator was unaware (that is, incapable of knowledge) of the sale the 
circumstances indicated that the testator would not have intended ademption of the gift. An 
order was made that the attorneys were entitled to the fund representing the proceeds of sale, 
which were invested in the deceased’s name. Following this authority, the Court ordered that 
the applicant was entitled to receive 15% of the net proceeds of sale of the Wilston house.9 
On the second claim the court held that the gifts the attorneys paid to themselves ($115,000 
each) from the proceeds of the sale of the Wilston house were in breach of s66 POAA (Qld) 
which requires an attorney to exercise the power conferred by the principal “honestly and 
with reasonable diligence to protect the principal’s interests”.10 This was because there 
appeared no evidence of any benefit to the principal by these payments, though the attorneys 
argued it was done to increase the deceased’s pension eligibility and had been cleared with a 
previous solicitor.11 The payments were also in breach of s73 POAA (Qld) which requires an 
attorney not to enter into a conflict transaction (in favour of an attorney or attorney’s 
associate) without authorisation of the principal12 and s88 POAA (Qld) which limits the 
                                                            
4 The applicant also claimed relief under POAA sections 76 (application of the principle of substituted 
decision making), 85 (keeping and preserving accounts) and 86 (keeping attorney’s property separate 
from principal’s property), however it was held that these sections did not provide relief in the 
circumstances: ibid [85] ‐ [87].  
5 I bid  [34]. 
6 Ibid [46]. 
7 [1997] 1 Qld R 110. 
8 Ibid [58]. 
9 Ibid [59]. 
10 Ibid [74]. 
11 Ibid [73]. 
12 Ibid [76]. 
occasions on which gifts might be made.13 In this case the gifts were not gifts the principal 
might reasonably be expected to make and the gifts could not be said to be no more than 
reasonable in the principal’s financial circumstances.14  
It was argued that the attorneys should be excused from liability for the breach under s105 
POAA (Qld) on the grounds the attorneys had “acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly 
to be excused for the breach”. As to whether the respondents had acted honestly, the Court 
referred to Ede v Ede15 noting that Muir J “considered that acting in conscious disregard of 
the interests of a person to whom fiduciary duties were owed would normally constitute 
dishonesty; but also stated that consciousness of wrongdoing was not a necessary prerequisite 
to a finding of dishonesty.”16 The court was satisfied the respondents (attorneys) could not 
have honestly considered the distributions made to themselves to have been in the interests of 
their mother.17 Nor were their actions reasonable, because although it was submitted that the 
distributions were made on the advice of a solicitor, this confused the concept of 
reasonableness with whether the respondents were acting lawfully. In the absence of relevant 
material to demonstrate reasonableness, His Honour concluded that they were not acting 
reasonably.18 The respondents also argued they should be excused under s105 on the grounds 
of hardship. While the Court noted that hardship may be relevant in some cases to the 
question whether an attorney ought to be fairly excused for the breach, hardship would 
usually not carry much weight in cases where the attorney has personally benefited from the 
breach as happened in this case.19 Notwithstanding evidence that the respondents were of 
limited means, and that in particular Ms Rickard had dependent children and had used the 
funds from the deceased’s estate to pay out a home loan credit card debts, home 
improvements and living expenses with only approximately $40,000 remaining, it was held 
that considerations of hardship were not of such significance as to warrant relief under s105, 
even if the other conditions specified in the section had been met.20 In any event, the Court 
pointed out that if relief was granted under s105, there would be hardship to the applicant, an 
elderly man of limited means.21  
The Court then considered whether compensation should also be payable under s107 POAA 
on account of a loss of the applicant’s benefit under the deceased’s estate because of the sale 
of the Wilston house by the attorney. As there was evidence that the median value of houses 
in Wilston had increased markedly since the sale in 2006, Peter Lyons J held that the 
applicant was entitled to compensation, subject to the restrictions found in ss41 and 42 of the 
Succession Act.22  
                                                            
13 Ibid [81]. 
14 Ibid. 
15 [2007] 2 Qld R 323. 
16 Moylan at [77] referring to Ede v Ede [2007] 2 Qd R 323 at [28]. 
17 Ibid [91]. 
18 Ibid [92]. 
19 Ibid [95]. 
20 Ibid [98]. 
21 Ibid [99]. 
22 Ibid [100]. 
Relief still available under the Powers of Attorney Act (Qld) although the applications 
were made outside the time limitation periods and the principal’s ‘estate’ had been 
distributed under her will 
It was argued that the claims under ss106 and 107 POAA were subject to time limitations - 
for s106 POAA (Qld): six months from the date of death with power to extend time; and for 
s107 POAA (Qld): the family provision limitation periods in s41Succession Act (Qld) – nine 
months from death with power to extend time - and s44 Succession Act (Qld) are specifically 
applicable, s107(4) POAA (Act).23  
The applicant brought his claim almost two years after his wife’s death. Section 44 
Succession Act (Qld) allows an executor to distribute an estate not less than six months after 
death in the absence of notice of any family provision claim. Such lawful distribution 
prevents a family provision claim because there is no estate to which to attach an order.24 
Here the estate had been distributed more than a year previous to the applicant’s claim. 
However, the family provision limitation provisions do not apply to s106 POAA (Qld), and 
do not preclude an extension of time. Peter Lyons J was prepared to grant the extension of 
time, because the applicant did not have access to the will prior to August 200925 (with some 
evidence that the respondents prevented his access prior to this26) and therefore had no basis 
to believe he had any entitlement under the will. Further he was not aware that the 
respondents had gifted part of the sale proceeds to themselves until September 2009 when he 
made a FOI application to Centrelink27. He then made the application about four and a half 
months later, which Peter Lyons J considered was not “undue delay in making enquiries and 
ultimately in instituting proceedings”28 In response to a submission that the respondents 
would suffer prejudice by the granting of an extension, it was found that as the respondents 
had been “careful to ensure that the applicant had no information which might enable him to 
get his own legal advice” little weight ought to be given to submissions that they distributed 
the estate in good faith and changed their positions in good faith, believing that the estate had 
been properly administered.29  
His Honour also granted an extension of time under s107 POAA (Qld), drawing analogy with 
principles relating to family provision extensions of time as identified in Enoch v Public 
Trustees of Queensland30 by Margaret Wilson J, namely: 
a) whether there is any adequate explanation for the delay;  
b) whether there would be any prejudice to the beneficiaries;  
c) whether there has been any unconscionable conduct by the applicant; and   
d) the strength of the applicants case.  
                                                            
23 Ibid [106]‐[107]. 
24 Re Donkin [1966] Qd R 96; In the Will of McPherson [1987] 2 Qd R 394. 
25 Ibid [115] 
26 Ibid [113]‐[114 
27 Ibid [115]. 
28 Ibid [115]. 
29 Ibid [121]. 
30 [2006] 1 QD R 144, Margaret Wilson J,  
Applying these principles in the circumstances of the case he concluded that the extension of 
time to commence proceedings for an application under s107 should be granted.31 
Accordingly, the attorneys were required to compensate the principal’s estate for the loss 
sustained through their breaches of the POAA (Qld), that is the moneys gifted to themselves 
following the sale of the Wilston property. Such estate would fund compensation to the 
applicant of 15% of the proceeds of sale of the Wilston property plus a sum which took into 
account the increased value of the property if it had been sold on death.32  
Concluding Comments 
In respect of the claims for family provision and for damages for breach of a duty to provide 
a copy of the will, Peter Lyons J noted that the respondents had submitted that if there was a 
finding in the applicant’s favour on the first ground His Honour should not deal with the 
balance of the claims.33 Nevertheless, Peter Lyons J said that he was prepared to hear further 
submissions on the third and fourth claims.34 Given the outcome of the application for 
extension of time in relation to the s107 claim, which was decided by applying principles 
relevant to extending time in family provision applications,35 an order extending time in the 
family provision claim would be likely to be awarded, subject to an assessment of the 
strength of the applicant’s case. In this regard, a threshold consideration is likely to be 
consideration of the issues as to whether a family provision claim can be made given that the 
estate had been fully distributed prior to the applicant’s claims, which will preclude a 
successful claim as there is no estate to which an order can apply.36 It is arguable that an 
estate has not been fully distributed when because of successful claims under POOA (Qld) a 
subsequent fund has come into being. For example Hart J said in Re Lowe:37 
“In my view when an estate has been distributed there has ceased to be any estate of 
the testator out of which provision can be made...... It may not, however be true to say 
that there is no longer any jurisdiction to make an order because there is always the 
possibility that further property will fall into the estate.” 
Accordingly, it may be that the family provision application may remain viable.  
The third claim, had the issue been decided, would have also raised some new ground for 
consideration, that is whether damages can be claimed for breach of the duty under s33Z 
Succession Act (Qld) to provide the applicant a copy of the will.38 
                                                            
31 Moylan ibid [127] 
32 Ibid [129]‐[130]. 
33 Ibid [128]. 
34 Ibid [130]. 
35 Moylan ibid [127] 
36 Re Donkin [1966] Qd R 96 
37 [1964] QWN 37; quoted in  Preece ‘Lee’s Manual of Queensland Succession Law’ (2007) LawBook Co at 
[13.180] 
38 Any determination of this issue would necessarily involve consideration of Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 
164 CLR 539 by analogy, which considered similar issues from the perspective of the liability of a solicitor 
 Moylan clearly illustrates that the Powers of Attorney Act (Qld) is a potent sword to enable 
compensation to be recovered for loss sustained by attorneys who have misused their 
fiduciary powers or have not acted honestly and with reasonable diligence in protecting their 
principal’s interests under an EPA. The case raises a number of current issues; principally, is 
there any duty to protect gifts designated in the principal’s will when exercising power as an 
attorney under an enduring power of attorney? As there is a long-standing common law rule 
that generally an attorney has no right of access to a  principal’s will, consequently there 
could be no duty where the attorney has no knowledge of the contents of the will as in Re 
Viertel,39 but where the contents of a will are known the situation may be different. However 
the decision in Moylan protected the will beneficiary’s interests by application of general 
principles applicable to fiduciaries enshrined in the POAA (Qld) rather than through any 
specific duty or legislative requirement. This issue is of current interest to law reform bodies 
such as the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, An Enquiry into Powers of 
Attorney, which recommended that the Victorian government conduct further investigation 
into whether the Powers of Attorney Act (Vic) should protect the interests of beneficiaries 
under a principal’s will.40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
for loss (including the property falling into disrepair and loss of rent) arising out of failure to notify an 
executor of the death of the deceased and the contents of the will,   
39 [1997] 1 Qld R 110. 
40Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, An Enquiry into Powers of Attorney, August 2010, 
recommendation 59. 
